THE ISRAEL/HAMAS WAR: THE DAY AFTER. A CONVERSATION WITH PROF. LEONARD GROB
Professor Leonard Grob continues his life-long work committed to fostering peace between Israelis and Palestinians. I recently interviewed him on the war and his vision for "the day after."
Joe Chuman: Can you briefly tell us something about yourself with a focus on the work you have done on Israeli/Palestinian peace issues?
Leonard Grob: During and after my forty-year career teaching philosophy at Fairleigh Dickinson University, I focused much of my research and activism on issues relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I have written, taught, and lectured about resolution of the conflict. Among my publications in this area is a book, co-authored with a Palestinian American, entitled Teen Voices from the Holy Land: Who Am I To You? and a co-edited volume, called Anguished Hope: Holocaust Scholars Confront the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. For over thirty years, I've been a leading member of the NGO Partners for Progressive Israel. I also serve as Vice President of a second not-for-profit organization, this one called The International Peace Consultancy. As a member of the IPC, I bring peace proposals to ambassadors and their deputies at UN Missions.
Why have I, a university professor trained in existentialism and phenomenology, devoted so many decades to the conflict? As the state of the Jewish people, Israel theoretically speaks for me, a Jew. I am not proud of an occupying nation speaking in my name and thus wish to work in as many ways as an American academic can to bring about a just peace with Israel's Palestinian neighbors. Further, as a human being I wish to contribute what I can to help break the cycle of a people-- among the most abused throughout history--coming to power and then abusing others, in this instance Palestinians.
JC: You are a former president and now vice-president of Partners for Progressive Israel. Can you describe Partner's mandate and how you are approaching the war in Gaza?
LG: Partners for Progressive Israel is an American NGO dedicated to deepening the understanding of American Jews regarding the need for a just peace between Israelis and Palestinians, including an end to the occupation and a two-state resolution of the conflict. Partners regards itself as an American voice of the Israeli left. Its mission also includes support for those working to ensure social justice, civil rights, and equality for all of Israel's inhabitants.
Like all who work for peace and value human life, Partners’ supporters mourned the dead of October 7th and supported freeing the captives from the massacre. From the very outset of the Gaza war, Partners understood that the Netanyahu government's call for the "total defeat and destruction" of Hamas was more political rhetoric than realizable goal. The death of over 30,000 Gazans, of whom more than two-thirds are estimated to be civilians, has since been reported. Five months into the conflict, approximately a third of Gaza's fighters have been thought to be killed. Hamas today continues to play a role in Gaza. Only with U.S. recognition of a Palestinian State, included in a "day after the war" plan, would remnants of Hamas begin to be truly marginalized in Gaza. Engagement with state-building by a free Gazan Palestinian people on the path to self-determination would gradually take the place of any commitment to violent resistance.
JC: I note that Partners for Progressive Israel has currently called for a cease-fire in the war. What is the reasoning in this regard?
LG: At the outset of the Gaza war, Partners was hesitant to join those calling for an immediate cease-fire. The words "cease-fire" had often been co-opted by some on the left who failed to acknowledge the legitimacy of Israel as a state. At this juncture--five months into the war, with hunger and disease pervasive, with Netanyahu envisioning many more months of death and destruction--Partners sees no other option than to call on the U.S. Government to publicly support a bilateral cease-fire. Partners' call for a "cease-fire" entails the immediate release of all hostages held by Hamas in exchange for the release of a specified number of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.
Although a cease-fire is necessary at this time, it is not sufficient. Partners sees its call for a cease-fire as a prelude to immediate and intensive diplomatic efforts to launch a new reality on the ground, including an eventual full withdrawal of Israeli troops, recognition by the United States of a Palestinian state, and a revitalized Palestinian Authority coming to govern Gaza.
JC: As has often been reported, Israelis feel that the government, the army, and the intelligence services, have failed them. What do you believe were the major causes of these failures?
LG: Arrogance was certainly a key factor in the October 7th failure of the state to protect its citizens. The Government of Israel had no advanced plan for defending the country from a massive attack originating from Gaza. Arrogance had led to a tragic failure of imagination: How was it possible that Hamas could breach the fence? Cross the border in balloons? Attack from the sea? Netanyahu and his accomplices had come to believe, unquestionably, the widely touted myth of Israel's invincibility. An aura of invulnerability was spawned by such hubris. The government's leadership hailed the much-vaunted technological genius of the Israeli mind that had invented an electronic fence allegedly impenetrable to any invading force. The government rested on its past laurels, refusing to acknowledge warning signs--some of them ignored as the result of the misogyny of officials who failed to respond to the testimony of female spotters. Many spoke of such warnings as mere fantasy. Finally, two companies of troops stationed on the Gaza border had been deployed to the West Bank just two days prior to October 7th. Protecting settlers took precedence over the protection of Israeli citizens located in the surrounding kibbutzim and other communities in the Gaza Envelope. The massacre followed.
JC: What have been the emotional responses of the Israeli people to this massive breach in security?
LG: Israelis' initial response to the security breach was stunned incredulity, first that the border could have been breached and then, immediately following, that the IDF had not come to rescue victims in anything resembling a timely manner. Most Israelis had fallen victim to idealizing the IDF as an almighty body. However, incredulity soon gave way to anger. Why are our protectors not here? Hours passed before a sizable force came upon the scene of the massacre. Had there been any advanced warning--had what was so often deemed "fantasy" been understood as real--the delay would have been substantially reduced. It had taken substantial time for individual commanders to realize that it was not just their sector that was under attack, but 28 others as well. Anger among many Israelis soon turned to rage, to a fury which may has dissipated somewhat with the passing of time, but which nonetheless remains as a living vestige of October 7th.
JC: Netanyahu's popularity (and that of Likud) has plummeted, something very unusual in wartime, especially when one's nation has been attacked. What are the causes of Netanyahu's pervasive unpopularity?
LG: Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, like any head of state in the face of government failure, is ultimately responsible for the massacre of October 7th. Yet although other Israelis in leadership roles have acknowledged their responsibility for allowing the slaughter to occur, Netanyahu has avoided doing so, at times heaping blame solely on intelligence and other security agencies.
Many Israelis believe that Netanyahu’s main concern is not governing the country for the welfare of its citizens, but rather keeping his extremist coalition intact --and thus his rule as Prime Minister. Netanyahu has a special interest in keeping the war against Hamas going, thereby avoiding alienating those in the coalition to the right of him who might otherwise bring the government down. Should the government fall, a return to civilian life would mean Netanyahu would be forced to face charges of corruption against him as an ordinary citizen. Bibi has allowed heads of the two extremist parties in his coalition to publicly put the goal of fully destroying Hamas ahead of the endeavor to rescue the hostages, an unpopular view on the part of many Israelis. Inflammatory statements by these extremists, including those supporting the death or transfer of Gazans, provided evidence that Israel was committing genocide in the early winter proceedings of the International Court of Justice.
JC: Do you think that after the war is over Israel will have a new government? If so, what do you think will emerge, and what kind of government would be best for Israel? How might this happen?
LG: Post-war elections may well lead to a new center/right or soft-right government, excluding the extremists of the current ruling coalition. Israelis are in no mood to elect any government to the left of the center/right. Although Netanyahu will make the case that he alone can prevent the existence of an independent Palestinian state, the fact that so-called "Mr. Security" has left Israel so deeply insecure following October 7th will ultimately be the main cause of his loss at the ballot box. The anti-Bibi forces that led to his defeat in the late spring 2021 elections will likely reemerge after the war ends.
Whether a new government of the kind I've alluded to will support a two-state solution--to my mind the only way this century-old conflict can be resolved--is unclear. You ask about "the kind of government" that to my mind "would be best for Israel." I believe the trauma of October 7th will certainly give any new Israeli government pause before allowing for the existence of a Palestinian state. However, October 7th has also made clearer than ever--at least to some Israelis-- the direction the future must take if Israel is to be secure in its future. Thus the current crisis may give birth to two states understood as the sole opportunity to change the course of a seemingly intractable conflict. Finally, ongoing pressure from the international community, led by the United States, may very well advance the cause of two states.
JC: When I was recently in Israel, I was disturbed by what appeared to be a total blindness (except for commentators in "Haaretz") with regard to the extraordinary destruction of Gaza and the massive suffering of the Gazan people. How do you assess this blindness? Do you think it will change in time?
LG: Israelis are traumatized by the events of October 7th. I should say "re-traumatized," given the fact that Jewish Israelis are heirs to the trauma of the Holocaust. Missiles sent by Hamas over decades have terrified residents of the Gaza envelope, but they have not evoked Holocaust trauma in the same way as have the wholesale slaughter of Jews on that one October day. Speaking with family and friends during these last months, I have frequently heard it said that "everyday is October 7th." Israelis must opt to watch Al Jazeera or CNN to discover what is happening to Gazan civilians; popular television channels show only a tiny fraction—if any at all--of footage of Gazan children and women dying. Further, Israeli empathy for the Gazan "other" would seem to many to diminish what is deemed a proper response to the mass murder of fellow Israelis; compassion, it would appear, is a zero sum game. How long will this failure to commiserate with "the other" last? Absent hope and concrete plans for resolution of the conflict, failure to stand in the solidarity of grief with Gazans means that healing could take many years-- or even decades.
JC: Initially Joe Biden gave unqualified support for Israel, including military weapons. With the war and the suffering continuing, Biden's support has become qualified. How do you assess Biden's, and his administration's, approach to the Israel/Gaza crisis? Do you think that Biden has any substantive suasion with Israel? What do you think is the proper American response? How might the US relationship with Israel change?
LG: In the wake of the 2024 campaign for the U.S. Presidency, Joe Biden finds himself in a dilemma: Should he back Israel in ways similar to those manifest during the first weeks of war with Hamas, he risks losing votes from the many Americans--especially young Americans--appalled by the toll the war has taken on Gazan civilians. Should he, on the other hand, continue, as he has done most recently, to ramp up criticism of Israel over its failure to protect Gazan civilians, he risks Republicans labeling him anti-Israel, perhaps even antisemitic. Biden has attempted to straddle the line between largely unqualified support for and increasingly harsh criticism of Israel's conduct of the war. Attempting to balance these two approaches can work only to a point: Should Israel enter Rafah en masse and/or should children everywhere in Gaza continue to die in ever-larger numbers, Biden may be forced to pressure Israel more firmly than he has done in the past to initiate a cease-fire, even one without the conditions Israel has currently put on the table.
Unlike any other nation, the United States continues to have substantial suasion with Israel, even Israel under the current Netanyahu government. It is not primarily the annual 3.8 billion dollars or the proposed 14 billion for arms currently on the table that constitutes the heart of America's ability to exercise suasion on Israel. Rather, the U.S. is Israel's one truly dependable ally on the world stage, manifest both in the potential exercise of its veto power in the U.N. Security Council and in the assurance that in any future wars endangering Israel's existence, the U.S. will act on Israel's behalf.
The United States' "proper response" to the current war in Gaza would be to risk announcing that in a vote of the Security Council on recognizing Palestine as a state, it will forgo its veto power and join the 139 other nations who have already recognized Palestine statehood. Such a move may well set in motion a process that will pave the way for a two-state resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
JC: Netanyahu has been roundly criticized for not having a "day after" plan. What do you envision as the outcome of the war? Do you see a way forward to creating peace between Israel and the Palestinians? What do you envision as the best outcome? What would need to happen to enable your plan to be implemented? The war has ensured that the two-state solution, what I see as the only road to peace, is as low as ever. Is there any reason to believe that a commitment to a two-state solution can be turned around among the Israeli and Palestinian people, and their leaders? What would need to happen to make this possible? What is the role for neighboring regimes, the UN and the international community?
LG: We agree that the two-state solution is the only road to peace, and we also agree that given five months of war, this road to peace is fraught with special difficulties at this juncture. Hatred between the two peoples is perhaps at an all-time high. But as I have argued earlier, the same crisis that has led to an increase of hatred has also opened the way for new and bold peacemaking opportunities. The idea that Israelis and Palestinians would continue on the same path leading to massacre-and-massacre-in-return is now seen more clearly for what it is by many on both sides. Peace beckons, this time with renewed energy.
What steps can lead to the realization of two states for two peoples? Here is my vision: The first step must be a bilateral cease fire and return of the hostages. A call for the Security Council to recognize the State of Palestine follows; there is no U.S. veto. Palestine enters the United Nations as a full member. On the ground—certainly the site of extreme chaos at first--the peace is monitored by an interim government organized by moderate Arab states and staffed by Palestinian administrators who belong neither to Hamas nor to the PLO. Gradually, the interim government gives way to the return of the PLO to Gaza, now coming back not as the Palestinian Authority—an ersatz state—but as governors of the State of Palestine.
Initiated and overseen by one or more moderate Arab countries—possibly Saudi Arabia which may well have made peace with Israel by this time—the Palestinian government and Hamas negotiate the role of Hamas in the future of Gaza. Hamas accepts the authority of the State of Palestine, eventually giving up its arms not to its old rival, the Fateh party of the PLO, but to the State. The motive for Hamas’ endorsement of the State? The people of Gaza are now engaged in state-building, marginalizing, as I have noted above, non-state actors like Hamas who might disrupt, by the exercise of violence, the Palestinian move toward self-determination as a state.
Borrowing from the writings of my colleague in the International Peace Consultancy, Dr. Jerome M. Segal, I contend that the State of Palestine recognized by the U.S. must exist in Gaza first; Israel at this point in time will not allow for any part of the West Bank to become Palestine. To ensure that “Gaza-First” is not “Gaza-Last,” a new Israeli government, under international pressure, would call a halt to settlement construction and would monitor settler actions toward Palestinian villagers in the West Bank. A three-year period of testing the viability of Gaza as the Palestinian State would ensue. Only when Israel sees that it can live in peace with its Palestinian neighbors would it complete its withdrawal from Gaza and re-open the border. At the same time, Gaza would be in the process of being rebuilt by the international community under the possible leadership of several Gulf States. At the end of three years, assuming that Israel and Gazan Palestine have lived side by side peacefully, final status negotiations between the states of Israel and Palestine would begin; the future of the West Bank would a key element to be negotiated.
Clearly, the individual steps outlined here are not fixed in stone. Events will unfold, and as they do, movement toward a two-state resolution of the conflict will take shape. I have suggested one path toward this end.
JC: How do you personally sustain your commitment in the face of the dismal failure of the actors themselves to effectuate peace?
LG: In my work on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despair lurks around the proverbial corner. I am not deaf to its call. But I resist despair, I refuse to give despair a victory it does not deserve. Because what is the alternative? Any optimism that experience can’t sustain is most certainly shallow. What will be accomplished if I stop working for a just peace between Israel and Palestine? Concretely, I fortify myself against despair by working in solidarity with many other good people, both those present in person and those close to me even in their absence. I fortify myself especially during this time by engaging Palestinian friends in dialogue—or just “hanging out” with them. This morning I had breakfast at a restaurant with a close Palestinian friend. I returned home, ready to go to work, reenergized by the meeting. I strive to keep the face of the Palestinian before me as I write, as I lecture, as I protest.
Finally, I fight despair when I recall the philosopher Albert Camus’s depiction of Sisyphus, condemned by the gods of Greek mythology to push a weighty rock up a mountain, only to have it fall down, only to push it up again, onto eternity. Camus says that what interests him most profoundly during the course of this tale is the moment when Sisyphus sees the rock at the base of the mountain and starts his descent to roll it back up. Sisyphus’s persistence in the face of inevitable despair is such that at this moment, Camus says, he can imagine Sisyphus happy. My persistence in working for a just peace in the face of a century-old, seemingly intractable conflict is not to be compared with Sisyphus’s burden. But the tale gives me comfort, helps sustain me in the face of the daily newscasts that bespeak the horrors of this seemingly intractable conflict.
I am pleased that you have taken an interest in my essays. This is clearly an issue that evokes very strong passions and thoughts. In this time of divisiveness and politics driven by tribal loyalties and ideologies, it is my view that sober conversation across lines of difference is more important than ever. With that said, and as I have written in a previous essay, having worked in the human rights field, and studied the genocide convention, I conclude that the Israeli assault on Gaza does not fulfill the convention's definition of genocide. Yet innocent civilians as being killed in disproportionate numbers and it needs to stop.
The history of the Israel-Palestinian conflict is very complex, and I don't believe lends itself to a simplistic analysis. There remain people who continue to work for a peaceful resolution, and I posted this piece with those people and their good and necessary efforts in mind.
I appreciate your interest in the site. When I initiated this project more than two years ago, my intent was to establish a forum of respectful and informed conversation. The current war understandably arouses strong passions, yet it is highly complex and I refuse to reduce its realities to simplistic ideologies and polemics, which have captured the imagination these days of too many on the Left. I remain highly critical of the Israeli occupation and feel that the loss of Palestinian life in the current war is a great tragedy and needs to stop. If peace is the objective, then I don't see how polemics and screeds are helpful.
I define myself as a leftist and progressive and have been so since the 1960s. Yet, I find myself alienated from elements of the Left these days that have become overly ensnared with ideologies inspired by unnuanced and simplistic dichotomies of power inequities, inclusive of oppressors and the oppressed. Realities are far more complex in ways that defy such reductionism. This mentality has led to the position by some that refutes Israel's right to exist. What other nation needs to defend its very existence? Many on the Left support Vietnamese nationalism, Kurdish and Tibetan nationalism, (I do) but deny the right of Jews to national self-determination. Believe what you wish, but it is impossible for me to believe that the world, including many so-called progressives, don't entertain an unhealthy problem with Jews. For these reasons, I don't trust the BDS and kindred movements. Behind them lies a latent antisemitism (not with all adherents, of course). Fretfully there is a curretn outburst of antisemitism that is very overt, fretful, and ominous.
Consequently, I don't believe that "the only reason "the Left" is concerned is because billions of United States tax dollars go to fund one side of the conflict." As noted above, there are far more complex and unsavory causes that have to do with ideological fetishes internal to the evolution transpiring in sectors of the Left. Moreover, The US gives Sisi's Egypt two billion dollars per annum. But where are the Leftist protests against Egypt's liberal use of torture, and its brutish culture of political oppression? The conduct of oppressive Egyptians doesn't capture the moral imagination. But when it comes to Jews, it's a different story.
For the record. substantial American support of Israel didn't begin until 1967. Before that, France was Israel's primary ally.
Again, thanks for your interest. But I would prefer more reasoned discussion and less demonization.